Can Baydarol
In 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership of the European Communities (EC), Jacques Delors was the President of the European Commission. To be frank, we Turks did not like him at all. Delors would dismissively define European identity as ‘Judeo-Christian, Greco-Latin,’ meaning the intersection of Judaism and Christianity, ancient Greece and the Latin world, effectively closing the door on Turkey’s path to the EC. We still haven’t been able to shake off the traces of this definition made by Delors.
However, Delors also emerges as a Commission President who took very important steps towards European integration during his tenure from 1985 to 1995. From the moment the EEC founding treaty came into force (1 January 1958), it was considered sacrosanct, not even a comma could be touched. Different interpretations of the structure of the Treaty led to significant political disputes among the founding states, and the fear that touching even a comma would completely destroy the established order brought out a defence mechanism, especially among those who advocated federalism.
On the other hand, updating the Treaty had also become a necessity in light of evolving needs. In particular, the ‘Common Market,’ which was now considered complete, was insufficient to eliminate protectionism practised in various ways among member states.
In this context, as soon as he became President, Delors would deliver the message of transition from the Common Market to the Single Market. To secure the support of the business world, he would commission a report from the Italian economist Cecchini, which would reveal the cost of not achieving a ‘Single Market’. According to this report, the annual cost of ‘technical’, “physical” and ‘financial’ barriers exceeded $7 billion, and therefore this burden was incompatible with the spirit of the EEC founding treaty.
As a result of all these discussions, the ‘Single European Act’ would emerge in 1987, and the founding treaty would be amended for the first time. (At this point, I would like to note that I still object to the word ‘single’. The French word ‘unique’ could be translated as “distinctive” or ‘exclusive’). It should also be noted that while changes could be made regarding physical and technical barriers, each member state would not be willing to touch its own tax structure according to its own nature, and therefore no steps could be taken regarding financial barriers.
Following this brief review of the past, let us gradually move towards the present day.
During the Covid pandemic a few years ago, the issue that economic operators complained about most was the disruption of the supply chain in production. To the extent that the continuity of goods movement, which can be summarised as the shipment of raw materials, processed intermediate goods and final products, cannot be ensured, the production economy enters a major crisis. At this point, it is worth noting that the most important actors in the supply chain are the lorries that carry out road transport and the lorry drivers.
Naturally, transport is not only carried out by road. Air transport, railways and maritime transport must also be added to this. However, the high cost of air transport and the sluggishness of rail and sea transport in terms of time (especially with sea transport becoming increasingly risky due to the war) bring road transport to the fore as the most attractive means of transport. During the pandemic, border controls implemented for health reasons both within the EU and in third countries outside the EU caused significant bottlenecks in the flow of goods, or in other words, in the functioning of the supply chain.
So, can we say that the pandemic is over and the problem no longer exists under today’s conditions?
At this point, it is worth returning to Delors’ ‘physical barriers’ briefly described above and the prohibitions of the customs union mentioned in a previous article. The removal of ‘physical barriers’ implemented within the framework of the Single Document applies not only to EU countries but also to goods traffic between Turkey and the EU, with the entry into force of the Turkey-EU customs union on 31 January 1995. Although Turkish hauliers face border controls when crossing the first EU border, and the same applies to European hauliers crossing the Turkish border, the resulting time loss costs should also be considered a competitive disadvantage in proportion to the increase in the price of the goods carried on the lorry. In this context, we can consider this as a prohibition brought about by the customs union, namely ‘equivalent tax’ and ‘measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.
It is also necessary to consider the problems faced by drivers driving lorries in the same direction. While Turkish lorry drivers are required to have a valid visa that has not expired within the Schengen borders for every shipment of goods, there is no such requirement for European drivers transporting goods from the EU to Turkey.
It should also be emphasised that this situation creates unfair competition. In recent years, Turkish drivers have been waiting in the long visa queues that are the subject of complaints from every citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Even if they eventually obtain a visa, they are mostly forced to settle for short-term visas because they are not included in the ‘cascade’ (gradual extension of visa duration) system. Furthermore, the fees paid for each visa must also be taken into account.
In this context, we can evaluate driver visas within the scope of the equivalent tax and equivalent measures mentioned above. The fees paid for each visa are, in essence, an equivalent tax to the extent that they are reflected in the value of the goods transported, and an equivalent measure to the extent that visa refusals or very short-term visas hinder transport.
Having made these observations, let us return to today’s realities.
First, let us briefly review Turkey-EU relations. As of today, approximately 45% of Turkey’s total exports are to EU countries. However, about half of this 45% consists of exports made by EU investors producing in Turkey. In other words, the EU’s restrictions on drivers are contrary not only to Turkey’s interests but also to the EU’s interests.
If we consider the supply chain from a broader perspective, or in other words, if we evaluate it by including the entire Far East, including China, we need to highlight two types of driver identities. Let us place those originating from the EU in the first category. The problem of finding drivers to transport goods in the increasingly ageing EU countries is evident. Even if they do find them, the problems they encounter and will encounter at the eastern borders after crossing the Turkish border have a deterrent effect on European drivers when it comes to transporting goods to the Far East.
With regard to Turkish drivers, it is also important to note that our population is also ageing. On the other hand, the ‘visa problem’ is preventing young people in particular from pursuing this profession. Long-distance transport to the Far East, however, is not as problematic for Turkish lorries as it is for lorries originating in the EU, both in terms of habits and, in particular, because Turkish customs and practices are well known. It is expected to become even more attractive for Turkish transporters, especially when the Zegnazur corridor opens. Naturally, another assumption is that the opening of the closed borders with Armenia will present a significant opportunity for travel to the Far East.
Ultimately, the structure of EU drivers and the visas imposed on Turkish drivers disrupt the supply chain, which is not in the interests of either the EU or Turkey. We hope that these issues will be resolved as soon as possible for the mutual benefit of both parties.
The final word will be on the updating of the Customs Union. If the Customs Union is updated, it could be argued that the problems that arise in practice can be overcome. But when? Let us remember that approximately 12 years have passed since the European Commission, in order to obtain negotiating authority, prioritised EU interests and had a report prepared by the World Bank. The update of the Customs Union, which has been blocked for political reasons, cannot prevent the damage that has arisen because the update has not been made.