Osman Şenkul
Turkey has become the “world’s third-highest” in terms of food inflation, having overtaken Argentina last January to rank behind South Sudan and Iran. Even well before reaching this level, Turkey had already secured a clear lead in this area among European, G20, and OECD countries and had not relinquished it to anyone.
Given the latest global developments, particularly the impact of the Middle East War triggered by US and Israeli attacks on Iran, Turkey’s inflation rate of 36.44 per cent suggests it will not be easy for the country to relinquish its third-place position. In South Sudan, which is grappling with severe problems such as drought and land loss, food inflation has settled above 100 per cent (106), whilst in Iran it has reached 57.9 per cent; however, following Turkey’s closest rivals, Argentina (36 per cent) and Burundi (32.9 per cent), three countries (Haiti, Malawi, Bolivia) are in the 20 per cent range, whilst the rest fall within the 10 per cent range or below. Meanwhile, we should note that in none of these countries—Turkey’s closest rivals—does the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) measure ‘food inflation’.
Therefore, it would certainly not be wrong to say that Turkey needs to work hard to relinquish its top spot in the rankings.
Let us now turn to why Turkey, which has long carried the label of an “Agricultural Nation”, has fallen into this situation. First of all, let us recall that the primary factors driving inflation are “supply-demand imbalances” and “rising costs”.
It is important to emphasise that the key factors fuelling the supply-demand imbalance stem from a contraction in supply—driven by rising costs and the plundering of agricultural land—and a surge in demand fuelled by a growing population, particularly due to increased migrant inflows, despite poverty-driven declines in birth rates. In short, as the food supply reliant on domestic production has been unable to keep pace with rising demand, this has also paved the way for food inflation to accelerate towards becoming the world’s highest.
Furthermore, it is clear that it is impossible to simply brush aside the problem by saying, “The food supply is insufficient; what can we do…?”; you cannot extricate yourself from this situation merely by raising prices. Because, according to TurkStat data, the Turkish population—which, as of 31 December 2025, had increased by 427,224 people compared to the previous year to reach 86,092,168—must at least be fed enough to survive, even if not with the healthiest food. To achieve this, food must be imported from all corners of the world.
Let’s take a look at what is being done in this regard: Firstly, the Federation of Turkish Food and Beverage Industry Associations (TGDF) lists Turkey’s leading food import categories as follows:
Cereals: Wheat (the largest share), barley, maize.
Oilseeds and Oils: Soya beans, crude sunflower oil, palm oil, safflower oil.
Animal Feed: Meal and other animal feed products.
Other Products: Coffee, cocoa, beef/live animals, tropical fruits.
Among the staple foodstuffs imported from Canada—a country that stands out in Turkey’s food imports and is notable for its distance—lentils, soya beans, and other pulses are notable. According to the TGDF, Canada is a key supplier, particularly for red lentil imports. In addition to these, wheat and various agricultural products also feature prominently among the import items.
Accordingly, a significant portion of Turkey’s lentil (red, green) imports is sourced from Canada. Furthermore, soya beans, a key raw material for the agricultural industry, are also among the most imported agricultural products. Dried pulses stand out among the products sourced from Canada under the general import category. In short, a significant portion of Turkey’s lentil imports, particularly red lentils, is sourced from Canada.
In addition to data from the TGDF, figures from WorldFood Istanbul, Turkey’s leading food and beverage trade fair, also show the country of origin and total import value of food products imported in 2025. According to these figures:
RUSSIA – A total of $1.12 billion worth of food and beverage imports were made from Russia in 2025. The main imports from Russia were wheat ($420 million), maize ($97 million) and peas ($52.3 million).
USA – A total of $780 million worth of food and beverage imports were made from the United States. The main imports from the USA were soya beans ($149 million), almonds ($96.2 million) and walnuts ($64.6 million).
GERMANY – A total of $521 million worth of food and beverages was imported from Germany. The main imports from Germany were chocolate ($44.8 million), spirits ($13 million) and bakery products ($9.36 million).
BRAZIL – A total of $472 million worth of food and beverages was imported from Brazil. The main imports from Brazil were coffee ($107 million), soya beans ($93.2 million) and chicken meat ($13.4 million).
NETHERLANDS – A total of $409 million worth of food and drink was imported from the Netherlands. The main imports from the Netherlands were cocoa paste ($17.9 million), cocoa powder ($16.7 million) and coffee ($11.2 million).
CANADA – A total of 363 million dollars’ worth of food and beverages was imported from Canada. The main imports from Canada were lentils (264 million dollars), durum wheat (49.1 million dollars) and soya beans (16.4 million dollars).
ITALY – A total of $218 million worth of food and beverages was imported from Italy. The main imports from Italy were chocolate ($10.7 million), bakery products ($8.66 million) and pasta ($4.36 million).
INDIA – A total of $173 million worth of food and drink was imported from India. The main imports from India were rice ($13.9 million), chickpeas ($9.42 million) and cashews ($9.35 million).
UNITED KINGDOM – A total of $172 million worth of food and drink was imported from the United Kingdom. The main imports from the United Kingdom were whisky ($56.1 million), eggs ($11.3 million) and chocolate ($3.34 million).
BELGIUM – A total of $131 million worth of food and beverages was imported from Belgium. The main imports from Belgium were chocolate ($9.04 million), bakery products ($4.6 million) and confectionery ($3.03 million).
Upon examining this data, we see that the products most frequently imported from Russia are raw materials rather than ready-to-eat goods. The same can be said of the US and Canada, which export soybeans, durum wheat, and common wheat to Turkey.
Turkey sources most of its finished and luxury goods from Europe. For example, whilst whisky is the United Kingdom’s top export to Turkey, Germany, Belgium and Italy also emerge as significant markets for Turkish confectionery. Consequently, although the majority of the top 10 countries are European, the United States, Canada and Brazil are also among Turkey’s most important food and beverage suppliers. The only Asian country on the list is India.
In short, the data shows that Turkey, an agricultural nation, has also joined the ranks of the world’s leading “Agricultural Product Importing Countries”; more importantly, apart from our land neighbour Russia—even if via sea routes—the countries from which we import are located quite far from us; in particular, transcontinental nations such as Canada, the US and Brazil, which bear the brunt of imports, stand out. All of this has a significant impact on the cost of imported food products. Investigations and inquiries into why prices for domestic products are high always focus on – and are consequently justified by – “transport costs from Antalya (Adana, Gaziantep, Aydın, Manisa) to Istanbul”.
However, whilst the distances between transport routes within Turkey can be measured in a few hundred kilometres, the distances between transport routes—particularly those from overseas—can be measured in several thousand kilometres. Viewed from this perspective, we see that imports made to establish a ‘supply-demand’ balance in food inflation have, on this occasion, thrown the door wide open to ‘cost inflation’.
Another consequence of these imports is that, despite interest rates being pushed to levels exceeding the ceiling, exchange rates—which remain uncontrollable—are driving significant price increases and, consequently, fuelling food inflation.
In Turkey, it appears that another factor indicating food inflation—considered the primary driver of the poverty line, which has risen well above even the minimum wage—will climb even more rapidly in the coming period, is the increasingly widespread Middle East War. In particular, due to this war, which is expected to lead to cost increases across all petroleum products, prices for chemical fertilisers—which are also petroleum-based—have begun to rise as well.
Exchange rates, which have long influenced the prices of imported agricultural products, are now expected to cause price rises in petroleum products. Combined with rising exchange rates, this will rapidly drive up the prices of domestically produced agricultural goods as well. Consequently, it would be far from inaccurate to predict that food inflation in Turkey will be a strong contender for the ‘world championship’ even by TurkStat’s own measurements.
So how do we get out of this situation? The answer, of course, lies in properly implementing the agricultural support measures that have quietly slipped away from Turkey and have not been seen for some time; however, developments in this area have long since taken a turn for the worse. Far from increasing, budgetary support for agriculture is declining rapidly. For example, whilst 27 billion 112 million lira in support was provided to agriculture in the first two months of 2024, support for the first two months of this year stood at just 2 billion 56 million lira. More importantly, during this two-month period, not a single lira of support was provided for diesel and chemical fertilisers, which are considered the most basic inputs for agriculture. Yet, diesel – the primary fuel for agricultural machinery used by farmers to plough, cultivate and harvest their fields – must be provided to farmers free of charge or at a significant discount in Turkey, just as it is in all European countries.
To put this into perspective, the Netherlands—which has a total area of 41,864 square kilometres, not just agricultural land—provides substantial funding of 2.83 billion euros (147 billion lira) annually to farmers for modernisation, environmentally friendly production, R&D and rural development. These subsidies maximise productivity by encouraging greenhouse farming, precision agriculture and circular agriculture practices, and the Netherlands’ annual agricultural exports amount to 135 billion euros.
In short, the way to prevent Turkey—a country of 780,000 square kilometres heading towards the world championship in food inflation—from falling behind in this sector is clearly to provide agricultural support at least on a par with that applied in the Netherlands, which, with a total area of 41,864 square kilometres, accounts for 18.7 per cent of Turkey’s total land area. If these subsidies were increased proportionally (18.7 × 2.83) to 53 billion euros (2.75 trillion lira), it would be clear that significant agricultural exports could be achieved rather than relying on imports.
However, given that Turkey paid 640.1 billion lira in interest during the first two months of 2026, whilst providing only 2 billion 56 million lira in agricultural support during the same period, the extent to which this is realistic will become apparent as a result of the competition between the group delighted by the ‘championship’ in food inflation and the millions who wish to be relegated from this league.