Can Baydarol
The TRNC (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus) elections did not attract much attention in our country. With much more heated debate in both domestic and foreign policy, the prevailing view was that whoever came to power, the current status quo of unresolved issues would continue regardless, and Ankara would have its way. However, the results were not quite what Ankara had expected. TRNC President Ersin Tatar, who was seen as the guarantor of the status quo, suffered a crushing defeat against his rival Tufan Erhürman. According to unofficial results, Erhürman won 62.80 per cent of the votes cast, while Tatar remained at 35.77 per cent.
This result is a return to a federation-based solution, contrary to Ankara’s stance in recent years, which favoured two independent states in Cyprus. In other words, the era of Tatar, who refrained from any negotiation process during his term due to the two-state approach, is ending, and the era of Erhürman, who wishes to participate in the negotiation process within the framework of the United Nations, is beginning.
The first reaction to this process came from Devlet Bahçeli, an important partner in the ruling coalition. Taking advantage of the low turnout in the TRNC elections (approximately 60 per cent), which means that Erhürman’s legitimacy is open to debate, and the fact that the majority in the TRNC parliament did not shift to the left, he stated that the TRNC should decide to join Turkey. In other words, Turkey should not annex the TRNC; the TRNC should join Turkey of its own free will.
This approach reminded me of the propaganda campaign conducted by the late President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş, in Turkey during the famous Annan Plan discussions. Denktaş and his supporters in Turkey had escalated matters to such an extent that it seemed as if it was not Turkey that would annex the TRNC, but rather the TRNC that would annex Turkey.
It is also important to emphasise that the delay in implementing the Annan Plan contributed to the current intractability of the issues. When the plan was belatedly submitted for approval in both communities, although the TRNC side (if I remember correctly) accepted the plan by 75 per cent, the Greek Cypriot side, having been accepted into the EU as representing the whole island, was the side that rejected the plan by a significant margin. The Greek Cypriot side, which gained full EU membership, was taken seriously and sat at the table, even though Turkey’s arguments, including those of all the Turkic republics, were not accepted by any members of the international community. The material and political advantages brought by EU membership were constantly used as leverage against both the TRNC and our country as a whole.
So, can Erhürman’s election change this picture?
First, let us address Bahçeli’s intention to annex the TRNC, pardon, to decide on the TRNC’s accession to Turkey. This is somewhat like saying ‘amen’ to an impossible prayer. At this point, we must ask whether it is worth risking complete isolation and being seen as an occupying power by the international community.
My personal opinion is that ‘under today’s conditions, I am against the annexation of Cyprus by the current Turkey, but I am not against the annexation of Turkey by the current Cyprus.’
Having mentioned the delay in the Annan plan above, let us not overlook another delay that dates back much further. Immediately after the July 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, which we were absolutely right to undertake, Greece, having escaped the colonels’ junta, applied for full membership of the EEC (The European Economic Community), as it was then known. EEC officials, inclined not to accept Greece’s application on the pretext of Turkey, encouraged Turkey to apply for full membership as well. Unfortunately, the failure to submit this application, which can be considered one of the greatest mistakes in foreign policy history, marked the beginning of problems that continue to this day.
Although the EEC, which inevitably accepted Greece’s application, adopted a stance with Council Decision 1/97 stating that Greece’s full membership would not affect the EEC’s relations with Turkey, as soon as Greece became a full member, it demonstrated its ability to transform its bilateral problems with Turkey into bilateral problems with the EEC of that day, today’s EU. Cyprus’s full membership of the EU was also achieved thanks to Greece’s skills.
Returning to Erhürman’s election.
Could returning to the negotiating table within the UN framework change much under the current circumstances? Erhürman’s initial statement indicated that he would pursue foreign policy in coordination with Turkey. He made no secret of the fact that the current Turkish administration is not at all warm towards Erhürman. There are clear concerns about what kind of coordination might be possible. The Greek Cypriot side has a very strong hand against Erhürman, who will return to the negotiating table, so he must have Turkey behind him.
So, with all these developments unfolding, what will be the approach of the main opposition party, the CHP, which can also be described as the guardian of the Cyprus legacy (a reference to the famous ‘Ayşe is going on holiday’ message from the daughter of Turan Güneş, the Foreign Minister at the time, during the CHP-MSP coalition period)?
With the thought that it is at least the right of those who support him to expect some statements from Mr Özgür Özel on this sensitive issue, I will endeavour to address the topic in the next article, diversifying it with issues such as the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and energy.