Osman Şenkul
At the opening of the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Ankara, we announced that Turkey has taken measures to ensure that our defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030, and that we have already reached a 1.5 per cent share of GDP in expenditure related to security and resilience; we informed NATO leaders that we are thus aiming to achieve the 5 per cent target five years ahead of the 2035 deadline set in The Hague.
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, Turkey’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to rise to 1.64 trillion dollars in 2026, based on a growth forecast of 3.4 per cent. According to PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), a UK/London-based multinational professional services network, Turkey’s GDP is also forecast to reach approximately 1.7 trillion dollars during the same period. Calculations based on medium-term programmes and growth trends also indicate that Turkey’s GDP will approach the 2 trillion dollar mark by 2030.
As we emphasised in our article in issue 74 of the Bulletin, ‘according to NATO figures’, Turkey’s direct contribution to the NATO budget – excluding defence expenditure – amounts to 2.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Consequently, out of Turkey’s GDP of 1.6 trillion dollars in 2025, the amount paid towards the NATO budget stands at 36.8 billion dollars (1.73 trillion TL). Of course, this figure represents only its contribution to the NATO budget; in addition, defence expenditure within the NATO framework also amounted to 30 billion dollars (1.41 trillion TL) during the same period. Consequently, the funds channelled directly or indirectly from Turkey’s budget to global arms barons via NATO have reached 66.8 billion dollars (3.14 trillion TL).
Based on this, and taking into account GDP forecasts for the coming period, if we were to review Turkey’s commitments regarding its contribution to the NATO budget and defence expenditure, we can see that the resources channelled to a defence organisation that no longer has an enemy – and to global arms barons engaged in a race to fill the earth with killing machines – will also reach considerable proportions.
Calculations based on data indicating that Turkey’s GDP will reach the 2 trillion dollar mark by 2030 suggest that Turkey’s contribution to the NATO budget alone – excluding defence expenditure – will rise by approximately 172 per cent to 100 billion dollars. If we add to this defence expenditure—which, by increasing the current figure of 30 billion dollars by the same proportion, could reach 51.6 billion dollars—it appears we will reach a total of 151.6 billion dollars in NATO and armament expenditure. Even if we calculate this colossal sum of ‘contribution to the NATO budget plus defence expenditure’ using current exchange rates (46.87 TL), it amounts to 7 trillion 105 billion 492 million TL. In short, we have already committed, as of today, to channelling a significant portion of the resources to be generated from tax increases – which have been rising rapidly in recent years and have gained further momentum recently – into the NATO budget and to the arms barons.
It is also clear that the resources to be allocated to vital areas—ranging from education and healthcare to numerous other social welfare programmes, as well as food production, which forms the basis of nutrition—will pale in comparison to such a massive arms budget. This colossal ‘arms budget’ indicates that we will fall well short of the expenditure required, particularly to ‘curb food inflation’; for it appears that agricultural subsidies – which have not yet been elevated to the level of a legal obligation – may fall below their current levels due to the rapidly increasing NATO budget and defence expenditure.
This situation is also highlighted by the Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB): according to TZOB, as stipulated in the Agriculture Law No. 5488, the agricultural support budget must amount to at least one per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). TZOB President Şemsi Bayraktar, who argues that current support levels are inadequate, also puts forward the following urgent demands:
Statutory Ratio: Raising the share of support allocated to agriculture from its current level—which is well below even 0.5 per cent of GDP—to the statutory minimum of at least 1.0 per cent.
Premium Subsidies: The provision of a premium subsidy of 3 lira per kilogram for staple crops (such as wheat and barley) to ensure the sustainability of production.
Input Costs: Updating basic support payments per decare in the face of rising fertiliser, diesel and feed prices, and providing support to uninsured producers as well.
Yet we know full well that, as things stand, Turkey ranks third globally and first in Europe with an annual food inflation rate of 34.55 per cent – approximately 14 times the EU average.
Although high prices are linked to the exchange rate, agricultural input costs, energy and logistics expenses, climatic effects and structural problems in the supply chain, they are ultimately the result of the government’s lack of policy.
To attribute Turkey’s significant divergence from Europe and its neighbouring countries solely to global commodity prices, wars or climatic conditions would be an oversimplification. This is because food inflation is so high not only due to external shocks but also as a result of the government’s monetary policy, agricultural subsidies, production planning and market management choices.
Whilst food inflation remains in single figures in many countries facing the same external conditions, the fact that price rises in Turkey are running at over 30 per cent is proof that the problem stems to a significant extent from domestic economic and agricultural policies.
The primary cause of this situation is the government’s long-standing preference for a monetary policy that does not prioritise price stability. The depreciation of the Turkish lira has directly driven up the cost of key agricultural inputs such as diesel, fertiliser, animal feed, seeds, pesticides and energy. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) also highlights the impact of the currency’s depreciation on persistently high food prices in its latest assessment of Turkey. The report states that the rise in the cost of inputs such as seeds, pesticides and energy is largely exchange rate-driven.
The second reason is that agricultural subsidies are both insufficient and provided too late in relation to producers’ cost structures. Under the Agriculture Law No. 5488, the funds allocated from the budget for agricultural subsidies must not be less than 1 per cent of gross national income. However, the agricultural support budget of 168 billion lira announced for 2026 amounts to only approximately 0.27 per cent of the national income of 63.2 trillion lira (2025). In other words, even the support that farmers are legally entitled to is not being provided. Even the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget falls short of the support that should be provided to farmers.
Rising production costs are also a key factor in food inflation becoming entrenched. According to TÜİK data for February 2026, the agricultural input price index rose by 31.55 per cent year-on-year; in March 2026, the producer price index for agricultural products increased by 36.09 per cent year-on-year. In other words, the rise is not solely due to pricing on supermarket shelves. It is fuelled by cost pressures in the fields, in barns and during transport.
Despite this, the government’s efforts to combat food inflation are often confined to short-term measures such as inspections of supermarket chains, calls for temporary price cuts, seasonal import decisions or export restrictions. Yet the way to permanently reduce food prices lies in an agricultural policy that lowers producers’ costs, provides farmers with a predictable income, strengthens cooperatives, develops irrigation and storage infrastructure, and ensures that imports are no longer merely a temporary stopgap measure resorted to during price crises.
In short, the pressure on food prices has been exacerbated by the government’s choices—ranging from exchange rate policy to agricultural subsidies, and from import decisions to market regulation. And this stands before us not merely as an economic consequence, but also as the price to be paid for the management of agriculture and the economy.
Although there is no single official statistic from a government body showing the exact number of people living below the poverty line in Turkey, reports and data published by various organisations shed light on the situation from different angles:
Minimum Wage Earners: The net minimum wage for 2026, standing at 28,750 TL, is significantly below the poverty line of 35,758 TL for a family of four. Consequently, all households attempting to make ends meet on a single income, where the total family income falls below this threshold, are at risk of poverty.
Pensioners: According to data from civil society organisations such as the Revolutionary Pensioners’ Union (DEV-ES), approximately 96 per cent of Turkey’s more than 17 million pensioners – including widows and orphans – receive pensions below the poverty line.
World Food Programme (WFP) data: According to the Hunger Map data compiled by the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme, it is reported that approximately 14.8 million people across Turkey are unable to consume sufficient food.
Confederation of Labour Unions (TÜRK-İŞ): Their research highlights that, as the increase in the minimum wage has failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living, a large section of the workforce is struggling to meet even their basic needs.
The picture painted by all this data and these developments clearly highlights that, as has been the case to date, developments are emerging that make any potential positive change in Turkey’s agricultural support – which is already at very low levels – seem increasingly unlikely in the coming period. The most concrete example of this, of course, was the decisions taken at the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Ankara on 7–8 July, and Turkey’s commitments in this regard. Consequently, looking at the situation today, we can see that there is very little time left before Turkey—currently in third place—reaches the ‘world championship’ in food inflation with NATO’s support.