Can Baydarol
Following the resignation of Rauf Denktaş, the founding President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), in 2005, all subsequent presidential elections were won by candidates supported by Ankara, whether from the left or the right. In this context, for the first time, a candidate not supported by Ankara, Tufan Erhürman, emerged as the winner of the election. In our article written before the election results were finalised, we noted that although Erhürman had declared his intention to return to negotiations within a federal framework at the UN, which is Ankara’s current fundamental position on the two-state approach, he would not be able to act independently of Ankara. Essentially, in his speech following the confirmation of his election victory, Erhürman emphasised this reality by declaring that his foreign policy would be coordinated with Ankara.
Well, there are numerous possible answers to the question, ‘What are the underlying reasons for Erhürman’s election despite Ankara’s opposition?’ In addition to the phenomena that intensified particularly during Ersin Tatar’s term on the island and can be broadly described as all kinds of unethical developments (money laundering, drug barons running rampant, murders, scandals, etc.), economic problems caused by dependence on Ankara, and the ingrained helplessness that has resulted from being isolated for nearly half a century as a result of the embargoes imposed can be listed one after another. The fact that the margin of victory was much greater than expected can also be explained by Ankara’s misguided propaganda activities.
So what should we make of Mr Devlet Bahçeli’s outbursts and President Erdoğan’s cautious approach?
Mr Bahçeli, immediately after the election, questioned Mr Erhürman’s legitimacy and continued his stance that Turkey should annex Cyprus at the last group meeting, even assigning the TRNC a licence plate number: ‘82’.
In contrast, Mr Erdoğan at least congratulated Erhürman on his election success, leaving the door open for cooperation. Whether this situation will cause a rift in the People’s Alliance will likely occupy minds for quite some time.
So, is the federal model, which was initially Turkey’s position, realistic under today’s conditions?
As we noted in our last article, following the Annan Plan, which was accepted by the Turkish side on 24 April 2004 but rejected by the Greek side, which had secured EU membership, the last hopes for a federal solution would be consigned to the dustbin of history. Are the conditions for returning to a similar plan in place today?
The Greek Cypriot side will not be inclined to make any concessions to the extent that it maintains its position of strength at the negotiating table, thanks to the advantages brought by EU membership. The continued presence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is dependent on Turkey, at the negotiating table within the UN framework is unlikely to go beyond a symbolic appearance rather than a solution. Despite this forecast, we do not know what stance the US and the UK, in particular, will take during this period of reshaping the Middle East. Therefore, the outcome remains uncertain.
So, what stance can be expected from Turkey?
From our country’s perspective, the idea of Enosis, which is an extension of the Greek ‘megali idea’ in Cyprus, has never been abandoned. Although the pioneers of the idea, the junta of colonels in Greece and their representative on the island, Makarios, were dealt heavy blows and destroyed by the 1974 Peace Operation, they appear ready to revive at any moment, as they see the support of the international community behind them. In particular, the shifting balance of arms and Turkey’s efforts to weaken its air power are contributing to this sentiment becoming more pronounced.
On the other hand, it must also be borne in mind that the dominant role in the new Middle East configuration relates to energy resources and transit routes. In this context, the island of Cyprus stands out on the one hand as a cost-free aircraft carrier, while on the other hand it also has strategic importance in terms of undersea energy resources and transit routes.
Assuming that, within a federal structure, sovereignty will pass to the Greek Cypriot administration, except for a few token rights, what will happen to the maritime borders between Turkey and Cyprus? In other words, will we face a similar situation in the Mediterranean to the problems we are experiencing in the Aegean, in the context of the megali idea, which means encircling Turkey from the seas?
Although we oppose the code name 82, it is a reality of today that we are going through a period that requires great caution.