Is it time for a change?

By the time you read these lines, elections will have taken place in Israel. Looking at the situation today, one of the most likely outcomes is that Netanyahu will emerge defeated from the election. However, expectations suggest that even if Netanyahu were to leave, there would not be much change in Israeli policies; indeed, a more far-right coalition—one that finds Netanyahu’s military approach insufficiently tough—is likely to come to power. This is because the key factor determining Israeli elections is security concerns, and these concerns are particularly widespread amongst young people. Around 75 per cent of first-time voters support the far right.

So, what are the prospects for change? Will the new government, which is highly likely to lose the support of the Trump administration (as we shall discuss shortly), pay even a modicum of attention to the reactions of the international community? We cannot say at present. We hope to see an Israel that is restrained from committing further crimes of genocide.

Let us now turn our attention to the US. In a week’s time (3 November), elections will be held to renew one-third of the US Congress. According to opinion polls, dissatisfaction with Trump is at an all-time high, and it is highly likely that the Democrats will secure a majority in Congress, effectively turning Trump into a ‘lame duck’ for the remaining two years of his presidency. It is reasonable to expect that difficult times lie ahead for Trump—whose decisions will be curbed, or even largely blocked in this way—and for those who have pinned their hopes on him.

So, will anything change for Israel? In other words, will the Democrats’ efforts to rein in Trump lead to radical changes in US policy towards Israel? It is difficult to say, but given that such strong support for Israel is viewed negatively by the US public, and particularly considering the consequences of the warmongering regarding Iran, it is reasonable to predict that there will be at least some change in US policy towards Israel.

And what about us? It would not be wrong to predict that a electoral defeat for Trump would not yield positive results, particularly for the Erdoğan regime. It is inevitable that the promises made by Trump during the last NATO Summit (but not kept) will lead to an even greater impasse. The lifting of CAATSA sanctions, the issue of the F-35s that have been paid for but not delivered, new F-16s and upgrade kits, and the delivery of engines for the aircraft we produce ourselves may become even more impossible.

So, how will the future of our region take shape following these two elections? As is well known, we are currently discussing three significant international developments for us. Foremost among these is the Mecca Agreement—about which we have previously expressed our concerns in these pages—which has now come before the Turkish Grand National Assembly for ratification, and we have familiarised ourselves with its provisions. Let us reiterate that our concerns remain. From an interview given to the foreign press by an unnamed AKP MP, it appears that a motion authorising the deployment of Turkish troops to Yemen is also on the table. Although it is claimed that the troops to be sent are not intended for active combat but solely for training and other forms of support, what if the Houthis carry out operations targeting our soldiers? Will we find ourselves facing only the Houthis, or Iran, which is using them as proxies?

Even more intriguing is the question of whether we will be drawn into indirectly participating in the Abraham Accords – signed between Israel and certain Arab countries – to which Turkey has not been a party due to the Turkish public’s anti-Israel sentiment and Saudi Arabia’s refusal to recognise Israel from the outset? Are we heading towards the validity of the ‘Diamond’ (Sunni-Israeli) alliance that Netanyahu has outlined against the Shia alliance? One cannot help but be struck by Ambassador Barrack’s earlier remarks regarding Turkey’s future.

Naturally, the second significant development that has led to this framework being perceived in broader terms was the Badr Agreement signed between Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia. Cooperation in the defence industry may provide our defence sector with slightly greater financial resources, but what geostrategic consequences will this entail? For the time being, we do not know.

Mind you, whilst discussing all these assumptions, we must acknowledge that the underlying assumption that ‘the US dictates and the rest comply’ also lies in the background. Returning to Barrack, if we heed his latest threatening remarks to the effect that ‘the regime in Iran has changed three times, and we were behind all three!’, we cannot help but ask: ‘Why were you unable to bring about the fourth change?’ Weren’t you going to overthrow the Molla regime—which was being shaken by the pressure from Netanyahu—overnight, just as you did in Venezuela? On the contrary, you failed to go beyond merely consolidating the regime.

Let us also emphasise the third point, which is important for us and, this time, positive. The unanimous ratification by Libya of the agreement delimiting maritime zones between Turkey and Libya effectively dashes Greece’s aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean to a large extent. In this context, we must also congratulate Özgür Özel, leader of the New Party, for putting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her place when she expressed her disappointment. There is no place for domestic political polemics in foreign policy. National interests are the common interests of all of us and our children.

But is change limited only to issues that concern us directly?

Didn’t the elections in Serbia and Brazil, which took place last weekend, give us at least a glimmer of hope for the future?

In the hope that we shall meet again in days when the outlook, which has grown exceedingly bleak, becomes a little less so…