Can Baydarol
At the end of each year, it is inevitable to write articles asking ‘What happened?’ and ‘What will happen?’ about the year that is coming to an end. These articles generally highlight the negative aspects of the past year and, about the coming year, conclude with either ‘cautious pessimism’ or ‘cautious optimism,’ depending on the author’s perspective on the world, the region they live in, and their country, taking into account the current conditions. The author of these lines has always maintained a basic, naive line, opting for cautious optimism, but unfortunately, the pessimists have always dealt him heavy defeats. Whatever happens, hope must not be lost. With the logic that where there is no hope, we accept defeat, let us examine what the last weeks of 2025 have left us and how we will begin 2026…
For now, the title of this article summarises our perception. Think about what we have experienced in the last few weeks. A Russian ship was hit in the Turkish exclusive economic zone, even in territorial waters, in the Black Sea, which we never wanted to be a battlefield; Turkish ships were hit in Ukrainian territorial waters; Ukrainian ships, drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of unknown origin were infiltrating, being shot down or crashing in Turkish airspace. Is someone sending us a message? Is the message to get ready and join the war?
To better understand the message, we need to examine the course of the Russia-Ukraine war more closely. As I write these lines, news has been circulating that a meeting between Trump and Zelensky is expected to take place before the new year, with Zelensky expressing positive expectations from this meeting. Our optimistic side hopes that it will be the case, while our pessimistic side urges us to approach the matter with caution.
The Trump peace plan, which originally consisted of over 20 articles, has been reduced to 20 articles. According to the approaches, the parties have agreed on 90 per cent of the 20 articles. So what about the remaining 10 per cent? Should we be optimistic about this 10 per cent, which is the most crucial and addresses the real cause of the war? We will understand once the Trump-Zelensky meeting takes place. Of course, without forgetting the issue of rare earth elements behind all this. (By the way, let’s note that the world’s most important rare earth elements are in Turkey!)
So, where does the EU stand in these efforts between Russia and the US for peace in Ukraine? Throughout the year, we witnessed EU countries wishing to participate in the peace plans (or negotiations) being constantly belittled by Trump. So, is there any need for a false perception that EU countries wishing to participate in the talks, led by Germany, actually desire peace? Do the words match the reality?
At the last December EU summit, the project to freeze Russian assets in Europe (approximately €210 billion) and transfer them to Ukraine could not be implemented due to objections based on concerns that it would undermine confidence in Belgium’s banking system. Instead, a new support programme was agreed to provide Ukraine with 90 billion euros over the next two years. What this actually means is that the EU’s support will enable the Russia-Ukraine war to continue. Why?
If everything in Ukraine becomes peaceful, the next target will be European territories under the control of the former Soviet regime. Yes, Russia’s current conventional military power cannot sustain a war with EU countries. But can we ignore the nuclear threat? That question remains open-ended. Moreover, Putin’s recent military manoeuvres directly highlight this threat.
So what is happening on the NATO front in response to this threat? Does Federal Chancellor Merz’s statement that ‘Pax Americana is over!’ not echo French President Macron’s words from a few years ago that ‘the spirit of NATO is dead!’?
Doesn’t Trump’s message, which seems to say that we are leaving NATO in 2027, highlight the need for EU countries to act more quickly against the Russian threat and to support Ukraine in continuing to stall Russia? For a self-sufficient EU security, a defence industry budget of 800 billion over the next five years and the SAFE programme, with 150 billion euros allocated to ensure the participation of countries outside the EU, could be sufficient in terms of timing if the war ends early, despite all the allocated resources. Naturally, will the inevitable rise of the far right in EU countries, which will no longer be welfare societies, not increase concerns about the EU’s sustainability?
Let us now turn to our situation. More precisely, let us turn to the Israel-Greece-Cyprus agreement we witnessed last week, while keeping what was said above in mind for now. What is emerging is a military cooperation entirely against us, aimed at preventing Turkey from asserting its rights regarding the use of Eastern Mediterranean energy resources. So, is the power of these three countries sufficient to stop Turkey? Perhaps the right question to ask is whether such an agreement could have been reached without the backing of the United States in the background. Did Netanyahu, taking advantage of the current situation, say his words directly targeting our country after the agreement was signed, meaning ‘it is impossible to revive the old empire on our lands!’, only to us or to Tom Barrack? On the other hand, do we really have a project to revive the old Ottoman Empire? Should we interpret Bilal Bey’s image of ‘preparing for the Külliye’ in this context after RTE?
Let us turn to eastern Syria. What about the future of the process proposed and fully supported by Mr Bahçeli, namely ‘the elimination of the PKK, a permanent peace plan, etc.’? Has the PKK been eliminated, and haven’t all the remaining members merged with the PYD/YPG? Leaving aside these legitimate questions, it shows us that our concerns about Syria’s future continue. Finally, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statements, whether his speech in Syria was a technical glitch or whether a technical glitch excuse was used to prevent him from speaking further, show us that it was perceived as a red line by Turkey. In other words, isn’t it significant that, in response to Turkey’s announcement that it could intervene in eastern Syria, new US-made ammunition was sent to the region, making it clear that what is happening is unacceptable?
The message is clear. ‘If you intervene, you will face not only the PKK’s extension, the PYD/YPG, but also Israel/the US!’ Is the US really our friend, our ally? Since when has Pax Americana been valid for us?
Let us return to the middle and then the beginning of this analysis we are attempting to conduct. We have touched upon how the Russia-Ukraine war is perceived and reacted to from the EU’s perspective, and the absolute desire to gain time. At this point, one of the key elements of gaining time immediately is keeping the war within conventional limits before it escalates to the nuclear stage. At this point, I do not wish to delve into military doctrines that extend beyond the scope of these lines. However, with the assumption that everyone involved in the process is aware of this fact, it is probably clear that Turkey is the only country in Europe capable of continuing the war against Russia on a conventional front. The Turkish armed forces, which we have boasted about for years as NATO’s second-largest army, are now attracting the attention of all EU countries, primarily Germany (except for Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, which rely on the US-Israel duo). The visits to Ankara by the British Prime Minister and then the German Chancellor in recent months, the efforts shown for Turkey’s participation in the SAFE programme, are signs that they want to see Turkey alongside them in the new European defence doctrine that will be created, even if it is not full membership.
So, do we really want to be part of this new European defence project, the name of which we cannot quite pronounce? Essentially, how much will this structure, which will be created against Russia, benefit us? Are our interests that overlap with Russia’s, or that we do not want to lose, not important? While Erdoğan was offering Putin to take back the S400s, weren’t the drones that came as far as the skies of Ankara and fell on their own another message?
All that aside, do you think the crash of the Libyan chief of staff, who was seen as Turkey’s only friend in the Eastern Mediterranean, on his way back, was just a simple accident? Or is it part of a major conspiracy theory that we are trying to map out in this analysis and in the context of Turkey?
Yes, the title of this article is “blockade.” It could have been “Turkey under blockade”. I hope that as we move from 2026 to 2027, we will write about how Turkey managed to break free from the blockade. I will continue to belong to the category of ‘cautious optimists’ with all my naive personality, believing that reason will prevail.
Here’s hoping 2026 will be a good year for all of us…