Osman Şenkul
In the 4th century BC (360-370 BC), more than 2,000 years before the famous corporate and bank bailouts of the early 21st century in the United States, the first examples of corporate bailouts occurred in ancient Rome. During this period, the Roman state implemented rescue programmes with significant costs to save institutions and individuals in financial distress, much like the United States did during the 2008 crisis. However, the outcome was far from encouraging; the fundamental reason being that Roman politicians executed the rescue programme with the mindset of ‘favouring allies’ and ‘not extending a helping hand to non-allies.’
Behind the widespread ‘bankruptcies’ in Roman society at that time was the idea of ‘favouring one’s allies and oppressing one’s enemies.’ As the saying goes, ‘Rome was not built in a day,’ and despite the biased economic views of the empire’s politicians, its collapse took a considerable amount of time.
In ancient Rome, debt and interest amnesties were granted on numerous occasions; one of the earliest examples occurred in 367 BC, during a period of economic uncertainty known as the ‘chaotic period’ in Roman history, when Licinius Stolo served as Tribunus (Tribune, or People’s Representative). The Roman state administration of the time passed a law through the Senate that amounted to a full ‘interest amnesty’ in the modern sense. This law forgave all interest on debts for a period of three years; in other words, all interest on debts dating back to three years prior to the law’s enactment was waived. However, this interest amnesty was insufficient to resolve the situation, and in 352 BCE, the Senate passed another law: this time, all debts were paid to creditors from the state treasury, on the condition that the debtors would repay the state.
Almost 24 centuries after these events in ancient Rome, we are witnessing similar developments in Turkey in recent times. For example, there has been a rapid increase in the number of companies going bankrupt, especially since last year. Across Turkey, 121 companies went bankrupt in 2020, 116 in 2021, and with some financial support, this number dropped to 69 in 2022 and 65 in 2023. However, in 2024, when interest rates rose sharply, there was a surge in the number of bankrupt companies. Due to the intensification of economic difficulties linked to high interest rates, the number of companies that decided to file for bankruptcy increased by approximately sevenfold, reaching 465.
According to data from reports by the Ministry of Justice and concordatum-bankruptcy monitoring platforms, the increase in the number of companies going bankrupt in the first half of the year (January-June) accelerated further. Particularly due to the impact of the 19 March operations, bankruptcies in the first half of 2025 surpassed those of the entire 2024 year by 19 percent and those of the first half of the previous year by 101 percent, reaching 553.
According to assessments by representatives of the relevant sectors, fragility is also increasing rapidly in the construction and textile sectors, which account for 54% of all bankruptcies. According to data from the Social Security Institution, 4,504 businesses in the textile and fashion sector closed across Turkey in the last two years, while employment in the industry declined from 1,225,000 in January 2024 to below 1 million in 2025. In the first three months of 2025, 2,147 companies ceased operations in the textile and fashion sectors, resulting in a 35,460-job decrease in the industry. Since the end of 2022, the number of companies has decreased by 7,096, resulting in over 298,000 job losses; total employment dropped from 1.222 million to 923,000.
According to the Egypt-Turkey Business Council, there are currently more than 200 Turkish textile factories operating in the Nile Valley. Consequently, Turkey’s textile and clothing trade surplus with Egypt, which stood at $118 million in 2021, has declined to $171 million in 2024.
Additionally, 289 textile companies filed for concordat in the first half of 2025 alone. The largest share of bankruptcies during the same period occurred in the construction sector with 155, followed by the textile sector with 141 and the food and agriculture sectors with 112. In addition, 39 companies in the metal products sector, 38 in the automotive sector, 34 in the machinery and equipment sector, 32 in the transportation sector, 31 in the printing/publishing sector, 25 in the tourism sector, 19 in the healthcare sector, 16 in the petroleum sector, and 15 in the furniture sector filed for bankruptcy, 10 holding companies and a total of 205 companies from all other sectors also declared bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, there has also been a rapid increase in the number of companies filing for a concordat in recent years. In 2021, which was considered a period of recession due to the pandemic, 1,914 companies filed for concordat, followed by 1,587 companies in 2022 and 1,516 companies in 2023. However, despite the post-pandemic recovery, the number of companies filing for concordat surged by a staggering 131% in 2024, reaching 3,497, and has already climbed to 2,235 in the first five months of this year alone.
According to newly released data, the total pre-tax profit and loss of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s (ISO) second-largest 500 companies fell by 63.8% in 2024, from 95 billion lira to 34 billion lira. The sales profit margin fell from 8.2% to 2.1%, remaining well below the average of 7% over the past decade. More importantly, the real decline in sales from production among the ISO Second 500 companies entered its third consecutive year, with the number of loss-making companies increasing by 121% to 159. Additionally, these companies were required to allocate 81% of their operating profit for the year to financing, mainly due to the impact of high interest rates.
As can be seen from all these successive events, the economic fragility that increased during the period of high interest rates and high inflation was not limited to a few sectors, but spread to a wide range of services and industries. These developments, of course, primarily concern company owners and thousands of employees. However, the impact is not limited to this, as taxes account for a significant portion of total public revenue in Turkey, like in many countries. The most important consequence of this is the suppression of economic growth and the spread of poverty across a broader segment of society.
Although there have been minor changes over the years, taxes generally account for approximately 85-90% of total public revenue. For example, out of the total budget revenue of 6.9 trillion lira in 2024, 6.1 trillion lira came from taxes. Of course, the majority of this is made up of income tax and corporate tax, as well as the Value Added Tax (VAT) and Special Consumption Tax (SCT) that we all pay on our daily purchases. The remaining portion of the budget is composed of revenues from business and property, donations and grants received, interest and privatisation revenues, and, of course, fines such as traffic fines and late payment penalties.
These figures clearly show that the economic difficulties in Turkey are having a profound impact on companies. Many companies among Turkey’s second 500 largest companies are reporting losses, while thousands more are also suffering losses and struggling with debt. This means that corporate taxes, which make up a significant portion of public revenues, are falling significantly. In other words, increasing domestic support for public revenues, which are already heavily reliant on external sources, will become increasingly complex, making corporate collapse inevitable.
Despite many linking the recent sharp decline in the Turkish economy to the 19 March operations, these developments clearly show that the collapse began a year ago, during a period of high interest rates and rising inflation. Therefore, the 19 March operations were planned to continue to overshadow these serious economic developments, which were not yet apparent at the time.
The recent rapid rise in inflation and the severe consequences of rising unemployment in Turkey seem to confirm the validity of the interpretation that the practice of ‘favouring one’s allies and oppressing one’s enemies,’ which was widespread in ancient Rome, was effectively applied. As the saying goes, ‘Rome was not built in a day,’ and despite the biased economic policies of its rulers, its downfall also took a considerable amount of time. As a result, the number of those who echo the defiant refrain, ‘I will burn Rome to the ground, I will find you again, I will become yours once more, I am mad with a black heart,’ is growing steadily.
