Can Baydarol
First of all, it is worth pointing out straight away. Given my academic background, I do not—and cannot—view social phenomena, and in particular international and supranational structures, through an ideological lens. For me, the priority is, first and foremost, to understand the other party as best I can, and to interpret events in the national interest to the extent that I am able. In this context, I fully support the protests held on the occasion of the recent NATO Summit in Ankara as an exercise of a fundamental right, and I condemn the disproportionate use of force by the security forces. Saying ‘NATO, get out’ or ‘Let’s leave NATO’ is a right. Do I agree with these protest slogans? Absolutely not. As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey who has spent a significant part of my professional life fighting to secure a seat at the EU’s decision-making table—though ultimately unsuccessfully—I believe that, however justified you may be, if you remain outside the decision-making processes, you become passive rather than active. To withdraw from NATO, insofar as it means relinquishing the right to representation and voting within that organisation, is to step outside the NATO umbrella – which, in security matters, amounts to becoming entirely passive; to use a fashionable term, it is a full-blown existential crisis.
Anyway, following this serious introduction, let us turn to some assessments of the events leading up to and during the 36th NATO Summit. Naturally, let us examine the Trump–Erdoğan meeting—which was at least as intriguing as the Summit itself—and its outcomes.
First, a clarification. Was this meeting held within the framework of NATO, or was it merely a meeting between the two leaders? The NATO framework could be used to justify Trump’s failure to visit Anıtkabir; however, if it was merely a meeting between the two leaders in Ankara, the harshest criticisms could be levelled. Especially when one considers that Ambassador Barrack has, in his recent statements, implicitly expressed hostility towards the Atatürk regime, there is a significant degree of validity to these criticisms.
Let us now turn to Trump’s promises or announcements
Lifting the CAATSA sanctions, thereby enabling Turkey to take delivery of the F-35s it has paid for (whilst my records indicate there are six F-35s, the leaders spoke of five), acquiring new F-16s and F-16 upgrade kits, and finally paving the way for us to purchase engines for our Kaan aircraft. Naturally, within this framework, ridding ourselves of the S-400s is the first prerequisite.
Whilst these announcements sound promising, when certain realities are taken into account, the question of whether these matters are really that straightforward inevitably arises. If the lifting of CAATSA sanctions is a prerequisite for all these announcements, then – given that this is a US law – Trump’s decision alone is not sufficient; the approval of the US Congress is required. As Trump’s popularity among US voters continues to wane, there is a high likelihood he will lose seats in the mid-term elections to be held in November. Consequently, he needs to fulfil his promises as soon as possible whilst he still has the power to do so. But can he act swiftly? Can Trump afford to ignore the influence that the Jewish and Greek lobbies—which are lobbying to prevent the strengthening of Turkey’s air power—might have on the elections? It remains to be seen. As someone who personally witnessed how, when the Defence Economic Cooperation Agreement (SEIA) was signed between Turkey and the US in 1985, the US’s demands were met immediately and unequivocally, whilst Turkey’s demands were tied to expressions of hope such as ‘inshallah’ and ‘maşallah’, I cannot, for some reason, feel entirely satisfied. In fact, there is one thing that really pains me: the inclusion, within US aid, of expenditure by US soldiers in Turkish brothels – something I simply cannot forget, even though 40 years have passed.
Another concern stems from the very nature of international relations, which are classically based on self-interest and a give-and-take dynamic. As can be seen from the example I gave above, the balance between what we have concretely given (which, whilst currently projections, remain uncertain) and what we have abstractly received (Trump’s promises) is not yet fully known.
Let’s turn to the NATO Summit.
Throughout the day, we again watched news reports reflecting Trump’s theatrics. At times, these were tabloid-style stories about his relationship with Meloni—which had shifted from a great romance to one of mutual loathing; at other times, they were the crude remarks he directed at Denmark, particularly regarding the issues of Spain and Greenland. Far more significantly, Trump’s statements declaring that the ceasefire with Iran had ended sent shockwaves through the markets, which had been expecting positive news from NATO. The key points we gathered from the final communiqué and press conferences released at the end of the day are as follows:
-Reaffirmation of the NATO ‘Five’ principle (an attack on one is an attack on all). It seems that at this point, the other NATO countries told Trump, “They won’t attack you, but if you attack, we’re not part of that war!”
– The acknowledgement that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be closed by Iran as an international shipping lane.
– The assertion that Iran cannot under any circumstances pose a nuclear threat.
– The acknowledgement that Russia will continue to pose a threat.
– $70 billion in aid for Ukraine for the coming year.
– European countries significantly increasing their defence spending (as the US appears to be gradually distancing itself from its responsibility for European security).
– The reaffirmation of ‘NATO 3.0’, that is, its restructuring in line with new global conditions.
As for some thoughts on what these key points might bring in the coming days:
- It appears that a new mission is being assigned to us within the new European security architecture. Both our rapidly developing defence industry in recent years and the fact that we host troops – which no other EU country possesses – constituting NATO’s second-largest army are whetting the appetite of all European countries.
- When we speak of the European security architecture, we must also accept that our bilateral relations with Russia can no longer be as they once were. Beyond certain tensions, our hope is that peace in the Black Sea will not be disrupted and that the Montreux Straits Convention will remain intact. We cannot help but think of the Istanbul Canal.
- Our growing role in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Although we have stated that, as far as Iran is concerned, we can only cooperate on the clearance of mines in the Strait of Hormuz, our hope is that our bilateral relations with Iran will not be damaged.
- The establishment of a multinational corps (the 6th Corps, if I am not mistaken) in Adana.
When all these points are listed one after the other, we cannot help but wonder whether our country—which was viewed as a peripheral nation in NATO 1.0 and 2.0—is gradually becoming a core NATO nation. If our assessment is correct, we must also acknowledge that new advantages and risks lie ahead. We shall observe and evaluate these over time.
However, let us not conclude without making the following points.
Whether we like Trump or not, there is one thing he has said that is true. The EU countries, which have largely shifted the burden of defence expenditure onto the US, have reached their current position as part of a project for peace and prosperity. When it comes to Turkey, however, they have seen no harm in excluding us by hiding behind various pretexts.
Since they expect so much from us for the European security architecture, they too must make significant changes in their approach towards us – changes that go beyond mere words. For example, the immediate reaffirmation of our path to full membership, the updating of the customs union, the prompt resolution of the issue of EU origin, and urgent progress on the visa issue…
A word also on our domestic policy. Yes, our strategic importance is growing, but the citizens of the Republic of Turkey deserve to live and be treated under far better conditions. Our aim should not be limited to being mentioned solely in the context of military security, energy security and logistical security; it must be to move forward on the path to becoming the secular, social state governed by the rule of law, as envisaged by Atatürk. Those you call Trump or Barack may be here today and gone tomorrow, but we are a permanent fixture on this land and shall remain so.