Casus belli

Nov 9, 2025

Can Baydarol

Signs of discord between Bahçeli and Erdoğan over the Cyprus formula appear to have subsided for now, following Erdoğan’s recent statement that he favours two separate states rather than a federal solution for Cyprus.

At some point, I also understand Bahçeli’s concerns about wanting to see Northern Cyprus as the 82nd province. In a federal solution, the Greek Cypriot side would grant Turks token powers in the government to be established, and after demarcating their territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, they could encircle Turkey by sea in the Aegean and Mediterranean, in line with their unwavering ‘megali idea’ and ‘enosis’.

As is well known, on 31 May 1995, the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared Greece’s desire to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles as a ‘casus belli’, i.e. a cause for war.

So, if the same situation arises in Cyprus, and especially if the exclusive economic zone expands to the detriment of Turkey, will we declare ‘casus belli’ against Cyprus as well? If there is to be a war, will we fight our compatriots settled in Northern Cyprus?

Anyway, let us put aside the Cyprus fantasies for now and try to assess what the prime ministers and chancellors of two important countries who visited Turkey recently brought with them in their briefcases.

As is well known, British Prime Minister Starmer was in Ankara. He announced the good news that the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, which Turkey had wanted to purchase for a long time but had been blocked by Germany’s veto, could now be sold to Turkey. Starmer returned to his country with great joy, having met our country’s substantial demand (in terms of quantity and cost).

Then, German Chancellor Merz was in Ankara. In statements made after the meeting, Merz expressed his ‘desire to see Turkey in the EU’. A question from a German journalist about Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu stirred things up. Merz made a veiled reference to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, while Erdoğan mentioned the Ankara criteria, bringing the issue to betting scandals. Inevitably, some circles shared concerns that İmamoğlu could face accusations of being a ‘bookmaker’ in addition to the ‘spy’ allegations.

Following these two visits, the European Commission published its report, formerly known as the ‘progress report’ and now simply called the ‘Turkey report,’ which, in my opinion, deserves to be called a ‘regression report.’ In summary, it stated, ‘Turkey is increasingly moving away from the Copenhagen criteria; in this state, full membership for Turkey is unimaginable!’ Essentially, in Brussels, it is no longer the Commission’s “enlargement” unit but the ‘good neighbourliness’ unit that handles Turkey-related matters.

Returning to the question of why Starmer and Merz came to Ankara under these circumstances. In a recent article, I wrote that at the last meeting of EU defence ministers, they pointed to the looming Russian threat and agreed on the need to allocate a significant budget to the defence industry. I emphasised that they would transfer €150 billion to the SAFE programme and that countries outside the EU could also participate in the programme.

Naturally, it is clear that Turkey is at the forefront of countries outside the EU. Their Eurofighter sales to us are not for our sake. They are to keep the southern front strong against Russia. So, have we been able to join the SAFE programme? Greece, in particular, continues to use its veto cards because of the ongoing ‘casus belli’ situation, and the Greek Cypriot administration also continues to use its veto cards on the grounds that it sees Turkey as an occupying power on the island.

In this situation, the first question mark is whether the major EU states, which take the Russian threat so seriously, can resolve this issue.

The second question is whether it is in our interest to sour our relations with Russia solely out of concern for Western security interests.