Can Baydarol
9 May is a day of celebration for the whole of Europe. The defeat of Hitler’s Germany in 1945 is celebrated as a day of victory in both Western and Eastern Europe. In the EU, 9 May 1950 is also celebrated as the day the Schuman Declaration—named after the then French Foreign Minister and laying the foundations for today’s EU—was published.
On this occasion, I had the opportunity to attend a panel organised at AREL University at the invitation of my friend of over 40 years, Prof. Dr Uğur Özgöker. At the panel, I had the opportunity to listen to former EU Minister and Chief Negotiator Ambassador Egemen Bağış as the keynote speaker, as well as my dear elder brother, former Ambassador Uluç Özülker, and Dr Feyza Başar. I, too, tried to make a small contribution to the best of my ability.
After hearing all these views, some of my convictions have been reinforced. It is worth summarising them as follows.
The current situation has transformed Turkey into a country of far greater importance than in the past. In particular, the defence vulnerabilities into which the EU is increasingly falling have made Turkey an indispensable country for the EU in terms of military strength. Turkey’s recent strides in the defence industry are being closely monitored and appreciated not only in the region but across the globe.
In addition to our country’s military strength, our central role in the transit of energy resources to EU countries is one of the factors that has further multiplied our importance, particularly in the wake of the Hormuz Crisis.
Alongside these two factors, there is undoubtedly our role within the EU’s supply chain, serving as the central transport corridor—the only safe route for freight due to the conflicts to our south and north.
Despite all these facts, dissenting voices regarding Turkey continue to emerge within the EU. In particular, French President Macron’s recent support for Greece and his message that “if you go to war with Turkey, we are on your side!” represent the final desperate struggles of a politician whose loss of office in the near future is inevitable. In this sense, he is nothing more than a lame duck. Moreover, Turkey has had no desire to go to war with anyone since the time of its great leader Atatürk. All its defence expenditure is aimed at defending itself within the ring of fire in which it finds itself. As for France’s hostility towards Turkey, setting aside Macron’s stance, this can be explained by the fact that Turkey’s advances on the African continent run counter to France’s interests.
The statement by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which placed Turkey on the same axis as Russia and China, can largely be seen as a response to the remarks made by MHP Leader Bahçeli. The fact that von der Leyen retracted her comments following direct reactions from within the EU should actually be interpreted not as an attempt to sour relations with Turkey, but as a sign of her desire to maintain warm ties.
Undoubtedly, as the need for Turkey grows, it is clear that we must not give ammunition to those who wish to keep Turkey away from full EU membership. In this context, Egemen Bağış’s emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law was particularly noteworthy.
As for the question: ‘Is the EU now truly the EU we aspire to join?’…
As things stand, the EU is rife with major contradictions. As we have sought to express in these pages for years, there is, in fact, no ‘Union’ to speak of. At best, we can speak of a vast economic and trade area. Turkey’s deep integration with this economic and trade area, particularly through the customs union, is undeniable and is a reality that makes the EU indispensable for us.
Discussions regarding the future of NATO—driven primarily by the US and whose direction remains unclear—are fuelling rising fears of Russia across the EU, particularly in Germany. Poland and Germany, alongside the Baltic states, are among the first to ask whether we will be next after Ukraine. This situation is driving defence spending to astronomical levels, particularly in Germany, whilst pushing the EU further away from being a social Europe and leading to the rise of far-right populist politicians. In contrast to this, the defeat of Orbán in Hungary’s election, the victory of the left in France’s local elections, and Meloni’s defeat in Italy’s constitutional referendum can be regarded as positive developments. It is also worth noting the positive repercussions of Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez’s anti-Israel and anti-US rhetoric.
But would it be satisfactory for us to position ourselves solely on the defensive side of the EU by treating Russia as an adversary? I do not know about you, but my answer is no.
Poland’s and Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy, and the fact that these two countries are inevitably adopting pro-Russian policies, is raising concerns about whether there will be further divisions within the EU following Brexit. How different a policy can Magyar, who defeated Orbán in Hungary, actually pursue? We shall have to wait and see.
It is also worth heeding Mr Özülker’s remarks regarding our prospects for full membership. “The EU is not yet ready to accept us as full members, but an offer will come from them shortly!”
Do I share the same optimism? Looking at the real-world political data that shapes foreign policy, yes. However, when we look at how closely we align with the set of EU values—the very existence of which we are now debating—the difficulty of saying ‘yes’ is plain to see. Am I as eager to become a full member of the EU as I was in my youth? I cannot say. It has been approximately 63 years since the signing of the Ankara Agreement, which established a partnership between Turkey and the EEC (as it was then known), up to the present day (12 September 1963). In other words, the limits of our patience have been thoroughly tested. There’s no harm in waiting a little longer to find the answer to this final question…
Take care…